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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ENJOINING THE USE OF A PERSON'S NAME.

A discussion of the power of a court of equity to enjoin the use
of a person's name may be materially enhanced by a reference to the
historical background underlying the use of names in general. A name
has been defined as a word or words, designation or appellation, used
to distinguish a person or thing or class from others; and, more particularly, one or more words used to distinguish a person,, Since
ancient times a legal name has consisted of one Christian or given
name, and of one surname, patronymic, or family name.2 Formerly,
the given name of a person was considered the more important
4 of the
two,8 but in modern times the surname has been so regarded.
Surnames were frequently chance appellations, assumed by the
individual himself, or given to him by others, for some marked characteristic, as for instance, his mental, moral or bodily qualities, some
peculiarity or defect, or for some act done by the individual and well
connected with his name among his fellow beings. 5
At common law a man may lawfully change his name, or by
general usage or habit, acquire a name other than that originally
borne by him.6 The identity of the individual is the important consideration, and not the name he may bear or assume7 The history of
art and literature furnishes many examples of men who abandoned
the name of their youth and chose the one made illustrious by their
' People ex rel. Yates v. Ferguson, 8 Cow. 102 (1827) ; Matter of Snook,
2 Hilt. 566 (1859) ; People v. County Board, etc., 75 App. Div. 110, 7 N. Y.
Supp. 620 (1902).
Smith v. U. S. Casualty Co., 197 N. Y. 420, 90 N. E. 947, 26 L. R. A.
1167 (1910) ; Russ v. Stratton, 11 Misc. 565, 32 N. Y. Supp. 767 (1895) ; Frank
v. Levie, 5 Rob. 599 (N. Y. 1866); Matter of Snook, supra Note 1.
'Pfaulder v. Pfaulder Co., 114 Misc. 477, 186 N. Y. Supp. 725 (1921);
Matter of Snook, supra Note 1.
'Meyer v. Fegaly, 39 Pa. 429, 80 Am. D. 534. It is interesting to note
that surnames did not come into general use until the middle of the fourteenth
century and that their growth was not engendered by reason of statute. The
only exception to this seems to be a statute enacted during the fourth year of
the reign of Edward IV which commanded that every Irishman dwelling within
the English pale take an English surname.
'6 Smith v. U. S. Casualty Co., supra Note 2.
Supra Note 2. It was held in this case that N. Y. Civil Rights Law,
Sec. 60 through 64, added by L. 1920, ch. 935 Sec. 2, which relate to the change
of names by judicial proceedings have in no way changed the common law rule
relating to change of name except that a name once changed by judicial decree
cannot again be changed without resorting to the courts.
See also Doe v. Yates, 5 Barn. & Ald. 544, in which it is held that one may
lawfully take a surname for the purpose of bringing himself within the terms
of a will which provides that no person can take the estate unless he bear such
a name. The case was cited in Matter of Snook, mtpra Note 1, where the Court
said that the situation would be a good reason for a change of name by judicial
decree.
7
Gotthelf v. Shapiro, 136 App. Div. 1, 120 N. Y. Supp. 210 (1909) ; Bell
v. Sun Printing Co., 42 N. Y. Supp. 567, 3 Abb. N. Case 157 (1877) ; Matter
of Snook, supra Note 1.
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writings or paintings. Voltaire, Molire, Dant6, Petrarch, Richelieu,
8
Loyola, Erasmus, Linneus, and Balzac were assumed names.
The first limitation on this right of a person to acquire and use a
name other than that which was originally his, is that one may not
assume a name where the result would be to defraud others through
mistake of identity. 9 Equity will enjoin the use of a name where
10
This
there is a question of trade or business purpose involved.
must necessarily follow from the familiar doctrine recognized by the
courts of this state that equity will enjoin the use of one's own name
if such name be used fraudulently."
Statutory restrictions on the use of assumed names are numerous. In New York, it is a misdemeanor to obtain employment by a
false statement in writing as to a person's name. 12 Failure to file a
certificate setting forth the true name of the person or persons transacting business under an assumed name is a misdemeanor. 13 In
in any hotel under any
Massachusetts it is a misdemeanor to register
14
name but the true name of the person.
On the other hand it has been held 15 that one who has used an
assumed name for a number of years, without being known or transacting business under any other name, even though he has not obtained a decree of a court changing his name, is not using a fictitious
name within the meaning of a statute forbidding the transacting or
conducting of business under an assumed name.
It is quite apparent that though there exists an absolute right to
assume any name which we may choose, this prerogative may not be
exercised when mistaken identity, resulting in positive injury, will
follow. But will a court of equity enjoin the use of an assumed name
where the only injury contemplated is a reflection upon the morals
and character of the plaintiff ?
'S. Baring-Gould's Famous Names and Their Story. In his chapter on
changed names the author gives many examples of men well known to history
who changed their name by simply adopting a new one in place of the old.
'International Union Bank v. National Surety Co., 245 N. Y. 368, 157
N. E. 269 (1927).
" Prince Mfg. Co. v. Prince's Metallic Paint Co., 135 N. Y. 24, 31 N. E.
990, 17 L. R. A. 129 (1892) ; Falk v. American West Indies Co., 71 App. Div.
320, 75 N. Y. Supp. 964 (1st Dept., 1902); National Distilling Co. v. Century
Liquor, etc. Co., 183 Fed. 206 (C. C. A., 6th, 1910).
Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N. Y. 462, 39 N. E. 490, 43 Am.
St. Rep. 769 (1895); Meneely v. Meneely, 62 N. Y. 427, 20 Am. Rep. 489
(1875) ; World's Dispensary. etc. v. Pierce. 138 App. Div. 401, 122 N. Y. Supp.
818 (4th Dept., 1910); Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S. 540, 35 Sup.
Ct. 625, 35 L. ed. 247 (1890).
'N. Y. Penal Law. Sec. 939; Morgan Munitions Supply Co. v. Studebaker
Corp., 226 N. Y. 94, 123 N. E. 146 (1919).
' N. Y. Penal Law, Sec. 440; as to what constitutes transacting business
under this statute see People v. Whiting, 68 Misc. 306, 123 N. Y. Supp.
769 (1910).
" Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 140, Sec. 29; Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass.
458, 131 N. E. 573. 17 A. L. R. 274 (1921).
" Ray v. American Photo Player Co., 46 Cal. App. 311, 189 Pac. 130 (1920).
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In the recent case of Baumann v. Baumann 16 the Court said:
"The most serious contention of the plaintiff is in relation
to that part of the judgment which restrains the defendant
Ray Starr Einstein from using the name 'Baumann.' 17 Upon
marriage a woman takes her husband's name. (Chapman v.
Phoenix National Bank, 85 N. Y. 437, 439.) "
In the Baumann case,18 the situation presented was as follows:
Plaintiff and defendant, Charles Ludwig Baumann, were married in
New York in 1909, separated in 1921, and after a short reconciliation
again separated in 1922. They have two children. The defendant
Baumann obtained a Mexican divorce from plaintiff in December of
1924. He married the defendant Ray Starr Einstein in June of 1926
in the state of Connecticut. Defendants have ever since lived together
as man and wife and defendant Einstein has been known as Mrs.
Baumann, both she and defendant Baumann holding her out to be
Mrs. Baumann.
The relief prayed for was a declaratory judgment which would
declare the plaintiff to be the lawful wife of the defendant Baumann;
that the defendants were not and never had been husband and wife;
that an alleged divorce procured by defendant Baumann in Yucatan,
Mexico, was null and void, and that an alleged marriage between the
defendants subsequently had in Connecticut was null and void. Injunctive relief was asked for, enjoining defendants from representing
or holding out that they were husband and wife and from representing or holding out that the defendant Baumann was divorced from
plaintiff; also to restrain the defendant Einstein from assuming or
using the name, "Baumann"; and to enjoin defendants from going
through any marriage ceremony during plaintiff's life.
The Trial Court 19 granted plaintiff all the relief prayed for. On
the unanimous affirmation of this decision by the Appellate Division 20 defendants appealed by permission to the Court of Appeals.
By a divided court, the highest tribunal of the state 2modified
the
1
judgment by striking therefrom the restraining clauses.
It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeals, although fully
concurring in that part of the opinion of the lower court which declared the defendants not husband and wife, and that the plaintiff was
the legal wife of Charles Ludwig Baumann, refused to enjoin the defendant Einstein from using the name of the plaintiff. In so holding,
10250 N. Y. 382, 387, 165 N. E. 819, 821 (1929).

The trial Court enjoined defendant Ray Starr Einstein from using the
name "Baumann" in any form or combination. Baumann v. Baumann, 132
Misc. 217 (1928).
" Supra Note 16.
"Supra Note 17.
'224 App. Div. 719, 229 N. Y. Supp. 833 (1st Dept., 1928).
' Supra Note 16.
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the court did not rely on the familiar doctrine that equity will not
grant injunctive relief in cases where there are no property rights
involved.2 2 It said:
"We do not find it necessary to discuss the question of the
jurisdiction of equity to grant injunctive relief in cases where
there are no property rights involved. It is sufficient for the
decision in this case that there exists no legal wrong which
gives rise to correlative legal right." (It lics ours.)
When we consider that in the social and business world another
is claiming the title Mrs. Charles Ludwig Baumann, and is being
introduced as the wife of the plaintiff's husband, with all the attendant
confusion and humiliation which must follow, it seems that a mere
declaration of the plaintiff's status will be sadly lacking in effect,
with respect to this continuing injury which the plaintiff suffers. The
mere declaration that the plaintiff is the lawful wife of the defendant,
Baumann, and that the defendant Einstein is not his wife, does not
stop these defendants from holding themselves out to be husband and
wife and holding the plaintiff out to be divorced.
Although, as we have already observed, 23 defendant Einstein was
free to choose any name, is there not something unsound in a rule
which would deny to a court of equity the power to enjoin the masquerade of another's name and title and the infringement of the
mingled personal property rights which include the name and constitute the matrimonial status? By affirming the declaratory judgment,
the Court of Appeals conceded that the defendant Einstein having no
marital right to the name "Baumann," was assuming the use of the
name. The modern trend of equity seems opposed to the decision in
the case.
In People ex rel. LaFolette v. Hinlde, 24 which was an action to
enjoin the unauthorized use of plaintiff's name in the title of a
political party, the Court said:
"Nothing so exclusively belongs to a man or is so personal and valuable to him as his name. His reputation and
the character he has built up are inseparably connected with it.
Others can have no right to use it without his express consent,
and he has a right to go into any court at any time to enjoin
or prohibit any unauthorized use of it. Nor is it necessary that
'A discussion of this doctrine would have been of great interest in view of
the growing amount of legal literature which points to the fact that the time
has come for a square denunciation of this arbitrary rule of equity. In this

connection see Chaffee, Progress of the Law (1921), 34 Harv. L. Rev.
388, 407; Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights; see also

Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J.Eq. 927, 67 Atl. 103 (1907).

=Supra Note 2.

131 Wash. 86, 89, 229 Pac. 317, 319 (1924).
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it be alleged or proved that suck unauthorized use will damage
him. This the law will presume." (Italics ours.) 25
The decision in the Baumann case does not seem in line with the
progressive spirit of our present Court of Appeals. Perhaps the
Court feared that a contrary decision might be a dangerous precedent,
or perhaps the familiar cry that equity should not control the morals
of the people by injunction, moved the Court to the instant decision.
But is a court of equity to refuse injunctive relief when the positive
result of granting it would be the promotion of good morals?
The attitude of the Court on this and similar questions which
arise from domestic relations is assuming more importance each day.
While a declaratory judgment may serve to fully protect the rights of
the plaintiff in many cases, its effect is deadened when the parties
reside in a large city, when the coercive force of an injunction is
needed to protect that which every ordinary person aspires to, is
entitled to, and which a court of equity should protect, a good name. 26
BERTRAM

R.

BERNSTEIN.

WAIVER OF A WAIVER.

The doctrine of waiver is essentially an equitable one and it is
founded on the strong antagonism of the courts to forfeitures.1
' Interesting decisions which involved the question of injunctive relief
with respect to the use of a name are Burns v. Stevens, 236 Mich. 443, 210
N. W. 482 (1926) (where plaintiff and defendant had lived together for many
years although not married, and the Court gave injunctive relief restraining
the defendant from holding herself out as plaintiff's wife); B. P. 0. E. v.
Improved B. P. 0. E., 205 N. Y. 459, 98 N. E. 756 (1912) (where use of a
name similar to plaintiff's was enjoined, although no question of trade, industry
or business was involved); Edison v. Edison Polyform, 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67
Atl. 392 (1907) (plaintiff was not a business competitor of defendant and no
question of unfair competition was raised) ; Blanc v. Blanc, 21 Misc. 268, 47
N. Y. Supp. 694 (1897) (the Court punished defendant for contempt for failing
to observe that part of a divorce decree which enjoined her from further use
of plaintiff's name).
'In Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 App. Div. 104, 218 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1st
Dept., 1926), an action to enjoin defendant husband from procuring a Mexican
divorce which concededly would be invalid in New York, the Court said: "The
mere fact that the husband has secured a divorce from his wife gives grounds
for suspicion at least of the virtue and fidelity of the latter, on the part of the
general public, in the domicile of both parties, who are unacquainted with the
infinite variety of causes for which divorce may be granted in other jurisdictions
and have heard only of the statutory ground for divorce in this state. A wife
who has given no ground for divorce in this state where she and her husband have
always lived during their married life, should not be exposed to the humiliation
and doubt as to her status raised by a judgment of divorce in another state,
even if fraudulently obtained and invalid here." (Italics ours.)
'Draper v. Oswego County Relief Assn., 190 N. Y. 12, 82 N. E. 755
(1907); Stackhouse v. Barnston, 10 Ves. 466 (1805), "Waiver at law and in
equity are the same thing"; Commercial, etc. v. New Jersey, etc., 61 N. J. Eq.
446, 49 AtI. Rep. 157 (1901).

